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ABSTRACT—On June 19, 2019, the SEC released a report examining, in 
part, the adequacy of the accredited investor definition contained within 
Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 and soliciting public comment on 
potential changes to that definition. This Note argues that the current 
accredited investor definition, which determines who may invest in a private 
offering, does not adequately protect retail investors. Implemented in 1982 
with fixed wealth requirements to qualify, the accredited investor definition 
has never been significantly revised, despite four decades of inflation that 
dramatically increased the percentage of households who meet the 
qualifications of an “accredited investor.” Market developments have also 
increased the risk of investing in private offerings. These risks heighten the 
necessity for the accredited investor definition accurately to identify a group 
of investors who can evaluate the merits of a private offering and sustain any 
potential losses. To ensure that the accredited investor definition performs 
that job adequately, the SEC must revise the definition to meet the needs of 
the modern investing landscape. Specifically, this Note proposes that the 
accredited investor definition should require higher income and net worth 
thresholds that increase with the rate of inflation and that exclude retirement 
accounts from their calculation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Venture capitalist Aileen Lee coined the term “unicorn” six years ago 
to describe a privately held startup valued at over $1 billion.1 Once a rarity, 
there are now over 196 unicorn startups in the United States, with at least 
fifty-three reaching that status in 2018 alone.2 Unlike a publicly traded 
company, which must comply with the registration requirements of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act), these startups and other privately 
held businesses rely upon exemptions from the Securities Act to raise capital 
 
 1 See Aileen Lee, Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion- 
Dollar Startups, TECHCRUNCH, https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/welcome-to-the-unicorn-club/ 
[https://perma.cc/67DV-5FCG]. 
 2 See Gené Teare, The Crunchbase Unicorn Leaderboard Is Back, Now with a Record Herd of 452 
Unicorns, TECHCRUNCH (May 29, 2019 1:09PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/05/29/the-crunchbase-
unicorn-leaderboard-is-back-now-with-a-record-herd-of-452-unicorns/ [https://perma.cc/T8FW-E9C8]; 
2018 Was the Best Year on Record for New U.S. Unicorns, CBINSIGHTS (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/us-unicorn-births-venture-capital-2018/ [https://perma.cc/22KG-
4GGX]. Notable unicorns in recent years include Theranos, Lyft, Airbnb, SpaceX, WeWork, and Uber. 
The Unicorn List, FORTUNE, https://www.fortune.com/unicorns [https://perma.cc/3CKQ-CNEH]. 
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by selling securities through private offerings.3 With less than 0.02% of 
businesses in the United States publicly traded on an exchange, the amount 
raised through private offerings is huge—more than $3 trillion in 2017 
compared to $1.5 trillion that was raised through registered offerings.4 
Many companies choose to remain private because of the significant 
cost and regulatory burden of registering with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).5 While a lower regulatory burden benefits a company, 
it can create potential problems for investors. Issuers in a private offering are 
not subject to comprehensive disclosure requirements, so each investor must 
be aware of, ask for, and obtain all of the information necessary to make an 
informed investment decision.6 Without the correct information, investors 
may be unable to tell whether they are investing in a legitimate business or 
the next Theranos.7 Additionally, most securities sold through private 
offerings are restricted, requiring that they be held for a specified period, and 
do not have a well-established market, making their resale potentially 
difficult.8 Because of these increased risks, the SEC has developed elaborate 
 
 3 SEC OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. AND ADVOC., Investor Bulletin: Private Placements Under 
Regulation D, INVESTOR.GOV (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/ 
news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletin-private-placements-under [https://perma.cc/294K-ATJ9] 
[hereinafter Investor Bulletin] (“Under the federal securities laws, a company may not offer or sell 
securities unless the offering has been registered with the SEC or an exemption from registration is 
available.”). In broad terms, a private offering is the selling of a company’s securities that have not been 
registered with the SEC because of an exemption to the Securities Act and which is offered to only a 
limited set of sophisticated investors. See id. This Note will be limited to those private offerings conducted 
under Regulation D of the Act. 
 4 See SCOTT BAUGUESS ET AL., SEC, DIVISION OF ECONOMIC AND RISK ANALYSIS, CAPITAL 
RAISING IN THE US: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009–
2017, 3–7 (Aug. 2018), https://www.sec.gov/files/DERA%20white%20paper_Regulation%20D_ 
082018.pdf [https://perma.cc/DTY5-NVNM]. 
 5 Id. at 3 (recognizing that exemption from registration “particularly benefits smaller firms, for whom 
accessing public capital markets may generally be too costly”). 
 6 Investor Bulletin, supra note 3. 
 7 Theranos was a privately held company that jumped to a $9 billion valuation in 2014 before it was 
discovered that the company had fraudulently misled investors about the capabilities of its blood testing 
technology. The firm dissolved in September 2018 with investors losing nearly $1 billion. John 
Carreyrou, Blood-Testing Firm Theranos to Dissolve, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/blood-testing-firm-theranos-to-dissolve-1536115130 [https://perma.cc/ZFB9-UAAR]. The story 
of Theranos has turned into a cautionary tale, fully detailed in the book Bad Blood by Wall Street Journal 
investigative journalist John Carreyrou and a subsequent documentary on HBO. Margaret Lyons, 
Theranos and Elizabeth Holmes: What to Read, Watch and Listen To, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/arts/television/theranos-elizabeth-holmes.html 
[https://perma.cc/V4N2-GRXH]. 
 8 Investor Bulletin, supra note 3, at 1. Regulation D prescribes that securities sold under it “cannot 
be resold without registration under the Act or an exemption therefrom.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2019). 
Rule 144 provides a frequently used exemption for the resale of restricted securities but requires that 
those securities be held for one year, or six months if the securities are issued by an Exchange Act 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
510 
exemptive frameworks that govern private offerings and limit who may 
invest in them.9 
The most frequently used exemption is found within Regulation D.10 
Regulation D allows a private company to raise an unlimited amount of 
money from an unlimited number of “accredited investors.”11 The definition 
of an accredited investor includes institutions such as banks and investment 
companies, as well as any natural person who has a net worth of over 
$1,000,000 or who has earned at least $200,000 per year for the past two 
years.12 Intended to balance capital formation against investor protection,13 
the accredited investor definition uses wealth as a proxy to identify 
individuals whose financial knowledge, sophistication, and ability to 
withstand the risk of loss allow them to “fend for themselves” without 
needing the protections afforded by the Securities Act’s registration 
process.14 
When the accredited investor definition was adopted in 1982, the SEC 
made a policy choice to look only at an investor’s wealth to provide issuers 
with a clear, objective standard15 that could be easily administered to 
 
reporting issuer. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND 
ANALYSIS 660 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th ed. 2015). 
 9 Section 5 of the Securities Act requires that all offers and sales of securities be registered with the 
SEC or fall within a designated exemption. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2011). Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act 
exempts from registration any transaction not involving a public offering. Id. § 77d. This Note will be 
primarily concerned with Rule 506 of Regulation D, which provides a safe harbor for issuers looking to 
take advantage of the Section 4(a)(2) exemption. A safe harbor provides issuers with objective standards 
that, if met, create a presumption of compliance with the requirements of the exemption. See 
Section 4(a)(2) and Regulation D Private Placements (2019), Westlaw Practical Law Corporate & 
Securities Practice Note 8-382-6259. 
 10  Regulation D, 47 Fed. Reg. 11251 (proposed Mar. 16, 1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230). 
Of the $3 trillion raised through private offerings in 2017, $1.8 trillion was raised through Regulation D. 
BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 4, at 7–8. 
 11 Regulation D’s primary exemption is contained in Rule 506(b) which prohibits general solicitation 
of investments and allows an issuer to raise unlimited funds from an unlimited number of accredited 
investors and up to thirty-five other purchasers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2019). Rule 506(c) allows for 
general solicitation but is limited to only accredited investors. Id. § 230.506(c). 
 12 Id. § 230.501(a). For a full discussion of the accredited investor definition and its requirements, 
see infra Section I.D. 
 13 Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Ltd. Offers & Sales, 
47 Fed. Reg. 11251, Release No. 33-6389 (Mar. 16, 1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 239) 
[hereinafter 1982 Release] (noting that Regulation D and the accredited investor definition were intended 
“to facilitate capital formation consistent with the protection of investors”). 
 14 Regulation D Revisions; Exemption for Certain Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act Release 
No. 33-6683, 37 SEC Docket 588–89 (Jan. 16, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 Release]. 
 15 See 1982 Release, supra note 13. Traditionally, objective criteria were viewed as absolutely critical 
because the sale of securities to an unqualified investor could lead to issuer liability not only for that 
investor but also all other purchasers. Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and 
Undiversified: The Lacunae in Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 301 (1994). 
114:507 (2019) Accredited Investors: A Need for Increased Protection 
511 
determine who was qualified to participate in a private placement.16 That 
choice has done well for capital formation, with today’s private markets 
booming;17 however, over the last thirty-seven years, the protections offered 
to retail investors18 by the accredited investor definition have not been 
maintained. The monetary thresholds that provide the sole means of 
determining who is able to “fend for themselves” have never been revised, 
despite the effects of almost four decades of inflation.19 Without adjustment, 
the income and net worth requirements are effectively less than half of their 
original amounts, allowing “an ever-expanding group of individuals to 
qualify as accredited investors.”20 Accompanying this expansion are 
increased risks for today’s accredited investors due to the approval of general 
solicitation in private offerings,21 significant preemption of state securities 
laws, and an increase in the number of complex investment opportunities 
such as hedge funds.22 
This Note argues that the SEC, in order to fulfill its statutory duty to 
protect investors, must revise the definition of an “accredited investor” to 
meet the demands of the modern investing landscape. Part I begins with a 
detailed look at the history of the accredited investor definition and examines 
the different exemptive frameworks that preceded it. Part II discusses how 
the investing landscape has changed since 1982 and analyzes several 
developments since then that have made investing in private offerings 
riskier. Part III argues that the current accredited investor definition fails to 
adequately protect investors and should be revised to increase its wealth 
 
One error by the issuer could lead to disproportionate liability. Id. Rule 508, passed in 1989, helped to 
temper this concern by providing a safe harbor for unintentional, insignificant violations of Regulation 
D. However, concerns over compliance costs and ease of administration remain. Id. 
 16 A private placement is the offering of securities by an issuer that has not been registered with the 
SEC under Section 5 of the Securities Act. These offerings rely upon exemptions from the Securities Act. 
The term “unregistered offering” is often used interchangeably with private placement. Unregistered 
Offerings: Overview (2019) at 2, Westlaw Practical Law Corporate & Securities Practice Note 9-382-
8837. 
 17 Almost $1.8 trillion was raised through Regulation D in 2017. This exceeds the amount raised 
through public equity and debt offerings combined. BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.  
 18 In this Note, the term “retail investor” will refer to an individual, nonprofessional investor. This 
contrasts with larger institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, or 
hedge funds. 
 19 See infra Section II.A. 
 20 CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 8, at 563. 
 21 General solicitation refers to an issuer’s ability to market an offering using broad, non-targeted 
advertising through mass media sources such as television, radio, and the internet. See Section 4(a)(2) 
and Regulation D Private Placements, supra note 9, at 10–11. Previously, issuers were limited to 
soliciting only those with whom they had a “pre-existing, substantive relationship.” William K. Sjostrom, 
Jr., Rebalancing Private Placement Regulation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1143, 1152 (2013). 
 22 See infra Sections II.B–II.D. 
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thresholds, tie them to inflation moving forward, and remove retirement 
plans from the calculation of net worth. Part IV concludes with a call for 
action. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATION D AND THE ACCREDITED 
INVESTOR DEFINITION 
Regulation D and the accredited investor definition trace back to the 
distinction between public and private offerings contained in the original 
Securities Act of 1933.23 An offering occurs whenever a business sells its 
own securities to investors to raise the necessary capital to meet its 
operational objectives.24 Although the conceptual difference between a 
public and a private offering may seem clear—namely the difference 
between offering securities on an open market or not—discerning what 
constitutes a private offering has proven a challenging question, and the SEC 
has long grappled with how to create workable rules that allow issuers to 
conduct private offerings with regulatory certainty.25 The product of many 
prior efforts, the accredited investor definition can best be understood by first 
looking at its predecessors. 
A. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Creation of the SEC 
The Securities Act of 1933 was enacted in the midst of the Great 
Depression and sought to restore confidence in the nation’s capital markets.26 
The Act regulated the offering and sale of securities, previously policed 
through a patchwork of state blue sky laws,27 and was designed to prevent 
fraud through required disclosure.28 The Act required that a security offering 
using interstate commerce be registered29 and carry with it a robust series of 
disclosures30 intended to provide investors with the ability to ascertain an 
 
 23 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2011) (exempting transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering). 
 24 CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 8, at 1. 
 25 See infra Sections I.A–I.D. 
 26 What We Do, SEC (June 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html#create 
[https://perma.cc/66XL-7QWY] [hereinafter What We Do]. 
 27 Blue sky is the colloquial name for specialized state statutes that were the almost exclusive form 
of regulating securities sales between 1911 and 1933. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 348 (1991). Following the passage of the Securities 
Act, this web of state law was left intact to operate alongside federal regulation. CHOI & PRITCHARD, 
supra note 8, at 584. Congress eventually narrowed the scope of blue sky regulation in 1996 with the 
passage of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act. See infra Section II.C. 
 28 15 U.S.C. pmbl. (2012). 
 29 Id. § 77e. 
 30 Id. § 77aa. 
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“accurate judgment upon the value of the security.”31 To help facilitate 
registration and the disclosure of information necessary to make an informed 
investment decision, Congress established the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 1934 and tasked it with enforcing the newly implemented 
statute.32 
From its inception, the Securities Act contemplated exemptions for 
transactions “where there [was] no practical need for [the Act’s] application 
or where the public benefits [were] too remote.”33 Section 4(a)(2) of the Act 
was one such exemption, creating a distinction between public and private 
offerings and exempting transactions not involving a public offering.34 While 
creating a distinction, the Act provided little guidance on how to determine 
what distinguished a public offering from a private offering. The Office of 
General Counsel at the SEC soon recognized this issue and issued a guidance 
letter in 1935 enumerating factors that should be considered when making 
such a determination: the number of offerees and their relationship to each 
other and to the issuer; the number of units offered; the size of the offering; 
and the manner of the offering.35 While courts did consider all four SEC 
factors in their review,36 the number of offerees became the dominant factor, 
and offerings to fewer than twenty-five people were presumed to be private 
under the Securities Act.37 
B. Judicial Attempts to Clarify the Private Offering Exemption 
In 1953, the Supreme Court acknowledged the need to better define the 
scope of the private offering exemption and expressly rejected the then-
standard method of relying on the number of offerees. In SEC v. Ralston 
Purina Co., the Court examined the legislative history of the Securities Act 
and held that a determination of whether a public offering has occurred 
 
 31 H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 3 (1933). The registration statement required, inter alia, information on 
the character and capitalization of the business, the purpose of the funds raised through the securities 
offering, the financial statements of the company, essential facts relating to the identity and interests of 
the company’s management and principal shareholders, and essential facts around the price of the security 
in relating to any earlier securities offerings by the company. Id. at 17–19. 
 32 What We Do, supra note 26. 
 33 H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 5. 
 34 Id. at 16. Note that prior to the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Section 4(a)(2) was the 
second clause of Section 4(1). 
 35 Letter of Gen. Counsel Discussing the Factors to Be Considered in Determining the Availability 
of the Exemption from Registration Provided by the Second Clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act 
Release No. 33-285, 1935 WL 27785 at *1–2 (Jan. 24, 1935). 
 36 See, e.g., Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975, 977 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (citing to the 1935 SEC 
letter and listing the four enumerated factors to be considered). 
 37 Lawrence A. Coles, Jr., Has Securities Law Regulation in the Private Capital Markets Become a 
Deterrent to Capital Growth: A Critical Review, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 395, 435–36 (1975). 
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should turn on whether the affected investors need the Act’s protection.38 An 
offering to sophisticated investors or those who were “able to fend for 
themselves” would not be a transaction “involving any public offering” 
because no practical need for registration existed.39 The applicability of the 
Securities Act’s protections thus depended on whether they were necessary 
in light of the investors involved. Notably, the Court also held that to qualify 
for a private offering exemption an issuer must demonstrate that it provided 
offerees with “access” to the same type of information as would have been 
available through registration.40 
While Ralston Purina provided some clarity around the private offering 
exemption, commentators were critical of the sophistication and access 
standards because of their ambiguity and the practical difficulty in applying 
them consistently.41 Lower courts began to interpret the sophistication 
requirement in a variety of ways, most focusing on an offeree’s business or 
investment experience.42 The access requirement was largely ignored until 
the early 1970s when the Fifth Circuit decided Hill York Corp. v. American 
International Franchises, Inc.43 and SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co.44 
In Hill York, the defendants relied on the fact that their offering was 
limited only to sophisticated professionals.45 The court, while agreeing that 
sophistication was a factor of importance, placed a greater emphasis on 
access to the type of information that would be found in a registration 
statement.46 It noted that the relationship between the issuer and offerees 
must give the offerees “special advantages” which made them different from 
the general public in their ability to obtain information from the issuer about 
its securities.47 The following year, Continental Tobacco built upon this by 
 
 38 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 127. 
 41 Julian M. Meer, The Private Offering Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act—A Study in 
Administrative and Judicial Contraction, 20 SW. L.J. 503, 505, 512–13 (1966) (stating that the viability 
of the exemption “may depend upon whether the [exemption] is ever challenged, and, if so, in what 
forum” which made “reliance on the private-offering exemption in any transaction a calculated business 
risk at best”); Fredrich H. Thomforde, Jr., Exemptions from SEC Registration for Small Businesses, 
47 TENN. L. REV. 1, 16 (1979). 
 42 See, e.g., Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1963) (affirming that the defendant’s 
wide business experience and prior ownership of oil stocks “place[d] him in a class not needing the 
protection of the Act” in regards to the sale of a fractional oil lease); Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898, 
904 (D. Colo. 1959) (noting that the plaintiffs were “experienced businessmen and experienced investors” 
who “did not need the protection of the [A]ct”). 
 43 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971), abrogated by Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988). 
 44 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 45 448 F.2d at 690. 
 46 Id. at 688–89 n.6. 
 47 Id. 
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clarifying that “the mere disclosure of the same information that would be 
contained in a registration statement does not assure exemption.”48 Rather, it 
must be shown that each offeree had a prior privileged relationship with the 
issuer that gave the offeree access to the necessary information.49 Continental 
Tobacco thus imposed a very high standard, causing some to believe that 
private offerings were effectively prohibited.50 
C. Rule 146, Rule 242, and the Small Business Investment  
Incentive Act of 1980 
The SEC responded to this uncertainty in 1974 by implementing Rule 
146, which attempted to lay out more objective standards for issuers to 
follow when seeking an exemption from the registration requirement.51 
Under Rule 146, an issuer (1) could not offer or sell securities through any 
form of general solicitation or sell to more than thirty-five purchasers, (2) 
needed reasonable grounds to believe that the offeree had such knowledge 
and experience in financial and business matters to be capable of evaluating 
the merits and risks of the prospective investment or reasonably believe that 
the offeree had the ability to bear the economic risk of the investment, and 
(3) must ensure that an offeree had access to or was furnished with the same 
kind of information that would be provided under the registration 
requirement of the Securities Act.52 An issuer’s compliance with the 
requirements of Rule 146 created a strong presumption that the issuer was 
entitled to a private-offering exemption. While Rule 146 sought to establish 
more objective criteria than the judicial opinions that preceded it, observers 
correctly predicted that it would “remain risky and relatively expensive for 
many small businesses to use the nonpublic offering route to raise needed 
capital” because of the disclosure requirements and the onus on an issuer to 
“make difficult, subjective decisions regarding an offeree’s ability to fend 
for himself and bear the economic risk of the investment.”53 
By 1980, Congress and the SEC recognized that small businesses across 
the country were struggling due to difficulties raising the necessary capital 
 
 48 Cont’l Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d at 160. 
 49 Id. at 158–59. The court appears to have added this requirement to further clarify that disclosure 
alone was not sufficient to ensure an exemption. Id. at 160 (“[M]ere disclosure of the same information 
as is required in a registration statement is not the alpha and the omega . . . .”). 
 50 Tom A. Alberg & Martin E. Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The Nonpublic and Intrastate 
Offering Exemptions from Registration for the Sale of Securities, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 622, 628 (1974). 
 51 Notice of Adoption of Rule 146 Under the Sec. Act of 1933—Transactions by an Issuer Deemed 
Not to Involve Any Public Offering, Securities Act Release No. 5487, 4 SEC Docket 154–55 (Apr. 23, 
1974). 
 52 Id. at 158–60. 
 53 Alberg & Lybecker, supra note 50, at 643. 
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for growth.54 Registration for a public offering and the preparation of the 
required disclosure documents took a small business close to six months and 
could cost around $660,000 in today’s dollars.55 With public offerings 
already cost-prohibitive for many businesses, the ambiguity of the Rule 146 
exemption further exacerbated the challenge of capital formation, which 
made private offerings burdensome and risky for a small issuer.56 
The SEC took action in 1980 with the adoption of Rule 242.57 The rule 
created a new exemption from the registration requirement of the Securities 
Act and was intended to support small businesses in raising capital while 
protecting investors by replacing the sophistication and access requirements 
of previous exemptions with objective criteria for issuers to rely upon.58 Rule 
242 allowed certain issuers to sell up to $2 million of securities in a six-
month period to an unlimited number of “accredited persons” and up to 
thirty-five other purchasers.59 Accredited persons were defined as certain 
specified institutions, purchasers of $100,000 or more of securities, and 
executive officers or directors of the issuer.60 If a sale involved only 
accredited persons, the issuer did not have to furnish them with any particular 
information; however, if a sale also included nonaccredited persons, the 
issuer was required to provide all purchasers with the information specified 
by the SEC.61 By allowing individuals who purchased $100,000 or more of 
securities to qualify as accredited, the Rule was the first acknowledgement 
by the SEC that wealth could stand as a proxy for sophistication and the 
ability to fend for oneself. 
 
 54 Susan E. Satkowski, Comment, Rule 242 and Section 4(6) Securities Registration Exemptions: 
Recent Attempts to Aid Small Businesses, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 73, 73 (1981). 
 55 The cost at the time could be upwards of $200,000. Id. at 73–74. Adjusted for inflation, $200,000 
in January 1980 would equate to $659, 532 in August 2019. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATS., https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/G9G2-LCY8]. 
 56 Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of 1933: Practical 
Foreclosure from the Capital Market, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1139, 1144 (noting that the ambiguity of the access 
and sophistication requirements of Rule 146 created problems that were “significantly more difficult for 
the small issuer than for the larger company”). 
 57 Exemption of Ltd. Offers & Sales by Qualified Issuers, 19 SEC Docket 295–96, Securities Act 
Release No. 6180 (Jan. 17, 1980) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.242) [hereinafter Rule 242 Release]. 
 58 Id. at 297. 
 59 Id. at 296. Rule 242 was limited to “Qualified Issuers,” which included any domestic or Canadian 
corporate issuer that was not a limited partnership, an investment company, a company engaged in oil, 
gas, or mining operations, or a company otherwise non-exempt under Regulation A. Id. at 299. 
 60 Id. at 296. Specified institutions included banks, insurance companies, registered investment 
companies, small business investment companies registered with the Small Business Administration, and 
employee retirement plans, provided a plan fiduciary made the investment decision. Id. at 298. 
 61 Required information was contained in Part I of SEC Form S-18. Id. at 296. Form S-18 was an 
alternative method of registration that allowed for public offerings up to $5,000,000 and included more 
limited, but still quite extensive, disclosure. Satkowski, supra note 54, at 84 n.82. 
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The SEC viewed Rule 242 as experimental and intended to monitor it 
for an appropriate length of time before making an ultimate determination 
on whether it should be continued.62 Congress soon forced the SEC’s hand, 
however, with the passage of the Small Business Investment Incentive Act 
of 1980, which, like Rule 242, sought to reduce regulatory restraints on small 
business capital formation.63 The Incentive Act, which was similar to Rule 
242 in most regards, modified the Securities Act and exempted a sale of up 
to $5 million of securities from registration (up from Rule 242’s exempted 
$2 million), provided that the securities were sold only to “accredited 
investors.”64 The Incentive Act limited accredited investors to specified 
institutions but also included a provision granting the SEC “rulemaking 
authority to expand th[e] definition to include additional types of purchasers 
as ‘accredited investors’ based on such factors as financial sophistication, 
net worth, knowledge, experience in financial matters, or assets under 
management.”65 Later that year, the SEC began an open comment period to 
examine the interrelationship between the recently enacted statute and the 
SEC’s other exemptive rules.66 After extensive review, the SEC determined 
that the then-existing registration and exemptive framework imposed a 
disproportionate restraint on small issuers (i.e., those trying to start small 
businesses).67 The Commission’s solution was Regulation D.68 
D. Regulation D and the Adoption of the Accredited Investor Definition 
Regulation D was adopted in 1982 as a safe harbor for the exemption 
within Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act.69 Intended to promote capital 
 
 62 Rule 242 Release, supra note 57, at 296. 
 63 Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980); 
Satkowski, supra note 54, at 74–75.  
 64 Consideration of the Impact of the Small Bus. Inv. Incentive Act on Certain Exemptions from 
Security Act Registration Provisions, Securities Act Release No. 6274, 21 SEC Docket 1013 (Dec. 23, 
1980). 
 65 Id. at 1018. The Incentive Act covered the same institutions as Rule 242 with the addition of 
“business development companies” that were defined in Section 2(a)(48) of the Investment Company Act 
of 1940 and intended to accommodate the need of “venture capital” activity. Id. at n.18. 
 66 1982 Release, supra note 13, at 11252. 
 67 Id. at 11251. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 11256; Regulation D, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (proposed Mar. 16, 1982) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. § 230). Rule 506 of Regulation D provides issuers with objective standards that, if met, provide 
safe harbor exemptions under Section 4(a)(2) for private placements. See, e.g., Section 4(a)(2) and 
Regulation D Private Placements, supra note 9, at 2. Regulation D is a nonexclusive safe harbor, meaning 
issuers can attempt to satisfy § 4(a)(2) directly by complying with SEC guidance and court opinions that 
have been delivered over the years. SEC, REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION OF “ACCREDITED 
INVESTOR” 16 (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/files/review-definition-of-accredited-investor-12-
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formation, particularly for small businesses, Regulation D established 
bright-line rules that provided issuers with certainty when conducting a 
private offering.70 In adopting Regulation D, the SEC rescinded Rules 146 
and 24271 and replaced them with a series of six rules that set out three clear 
exemptions from the registration requirements of the Securities Act.72 These 
exemptions were originally set out in Rules 504 to 506, with Rules 501 to 
503 composed of generally applicable definitions, terms, and conditions. The 
SEC revised Regulation D in 2016 to eliminate Rule 505, leaving Rules 504 
and 506 as its primary exemptions.73 
Rule 504 allows for the sale of up to $5 million of securities to an 
unlimited number of investors with no prescribed disclosure requirements.74 
The rule is limited to noninvestment companies and was created for small 
offerings by small issuers with the intent that it be governed by existing state 
blue sky requirements.75 Meanwhile, Rule 506 applies to all issuers, exempts 
them from state requirements, and allows them to raise an unlimited amount 
of money from an unlimited number of “accredited investors” and up to 
thirty-five other purchasers.76 The rule initially prohibited general 
 
18-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/SXL7-FUX4] [hereinafter 2015 Report]. Few issuers choose this route as 
it is unpredictable and adds additional risk to the transaction. Id. at 47 n.175. 
 70 2015 Report, supra note 69, at 18. The SEC’s stated purpose in designing Regulation D was “to 
simplify existing rules and regulations, particularly for small businesses, and achieve uniformity between 
state and federal exemptions in order to facilitate capital formation consistent with the protection of 
investors.” Id. at 16. 
 71 Regulation D also rescinded Rule 240, which was adopted in 1975 to provide a safe harbor for 
closely held corporations owned by one hundred or fewer persons and allowed for an offering of $100,000 
or less in any twelve-month period. LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, 3 SECURITIES 
REGULATION 354–55 (5th ed. 2015). The rule prohibited general solicitation but did not contain an 
information or access to information requirement. Id. For further discussion on Rule 240, see generally 
Robert A. Kessler, Private Placement Rules 146 and 240—Safe Harbor?, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 
(1975) (discussing the background of Rule 240 and arguing that the rule is inadequate as a safe harbor 
for small businesses). 
 72 Regulation D, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11251–52. 
 73 Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 81 Fed. Reg. 83494, 
Release No. 33-10238 (Nov. 21, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 230, 239-40, 249, 270, 275). 
In this revision, the offering amount of Rule 504 was increased from $1 million to $5 million, rendering 
Rule 505 largely irrelevant. Id. Rule 505 previously allowed all issuers, except investment companies, to 
raise up to $5 million from an unlimited number of accredited investors and up to 35 other purchasers. 
CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 8, at 560–62. 
 74 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2019). 
 75 Regulation D, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11252. 
 76 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2019). Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor must have “such 
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits 
and risks of the prospective investment.” § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). Rule 506 replaced Rule 146 and carried 
forward its concept of a purchaser representative whose knowledge and experience can substitute for that 
of the non-accredited purchaser. § 230.501(h). A purchaser representative, as defined under Rule 501, 
can be anyone with the knowledge or experience to evaluate the risks and merits of the investment except 
for an affiliate, director, officer or other employee of the issuer, or a beneficial owner of 10% or more of 
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solicitation but was amended in 2012 to add Rule 506(c) which permits 
general solicitation, provided that the offering is limited only to accredited 
investors.77 Over time, Rule 506 has become the dominant exemption, 
accounting for 97% of total offerings under Regulation D and 99.9% of 
reported capital raised since 2009.78 
Although Rule 506 is the most used exemption, the true centerpiece of 
Regulation D is its accredited investor definition. According to Rule 501(a), 
other than a limited exception for up to thirty-five nonaccredited purchasers, 
an individual must be deemed an accredited investor to participate in a Rule 
506 offering.79 This definition includes eight classifications under which an 
individual or entity can qualify as accredited.80 In regard to natural persons, 
Rule 501(a) defines an accredited investor as an individual whose net worth, 
or joint net worth with a spouse, exceeds $1 million at the time of the 
purchase,81 or whose income exceeds $200,000 (or $300,000 joint income 
with spouse) in each of the last two years with a reasonable expectation of 
that income continuing throughout the year of purchase.82 
Regulation D thus fully embraced the concept, first introduced in Rule 
242, of using wealth as a proxy for a natural person’s ability to fend for 
themselves.83 This change created a bright-line test that was objective, 
allowing investors to know if they qualified and issuers to verify easily those 
qualifications.84 Since its introduction, the accredited investor definition 
 
any class of the equity securities. Id. Exceptions to those disqualifiers are made if the purchaser 
representative is a relative of the purchaser, a trust or estate in which the purchaser representative is trustee 
or executor, or a corporation owned by the purchaser and purchaser representative. Id. 
 77 Congress, through a provision in the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, mandated that the SEC 
incorporate general solicitation under Regulation D; Rule 506(c) is the result of that mandate. Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106 § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 314 (2012). Rule 506(b) 
continues to prohibit general solicitation along with purchases by up to thirty-five non-accredited 
investors. 
 78 BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 4, at 13. 
 79 Rule 506(b) allows for the sale of securities to up to thirty-five nonaccredited purchasers; however, 
a sale to these purchasers requires that the issuer confirm the knowledge and experience of the investor 
or their purchaser representative and also imposes onerous disclosure requirements on the issuer. 
§ 230.502(b). Because of these heightened requirements, only 7%–8% of Rule 506(b) offerings actually 
include nonaccredited purchasers. See BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 4, at 35. 
 80 § 230.501(a)(1)–(8). In regard to entities, the definition provides classifications for banks, 
investment companies, employee benefit plans, savings or loan associations, private business 
development companies, corporations, trusts, and partnerships. Id. 
 81 § 230.501(a)(5). 
 82 § 230.501(a)(6). 
 83 Rule 242 allowed a purchaser of $100,000 or more of securities to qualify as an accredited person 
because it was believed that those individuals would have the bargaining power to acquire any 
information necessary to make an informed investment decision. Rule 242 Release, supra note 57, at 
298–99. 
 84 1982 Release, supra note 13. 
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itself has not undergone significant revision. The only noteworthy change 
occurred in 2012 with the passage of the Dodd–Frank Act,85 which mandated 
that the value of an investor’s primary residence be excluded from the 
calculation of net worth.86 Financial thresholds otherwise remain at the levels 
set in 1982, allowing an individual to qualify as accredited as long as they 
have a net worth of $1 million (excluding their primary residence) or have 
earned $200,000 for the past two years.87 
II. THE PROGRESSIVE WEAKENING OF THE ACCREDITED  
INVESTOR DEFINITION 
The Dodd–Frank Act mandated that, beginning in 2014 and at least 
once every four years thereafter, the SEC review the accredited investor 
definition as it applies to natural persons to determine whether the 
requirements of the definition “should be adjusted or modified for the 
protection of investors, in the public interest, and in light of the economy.”88 
While stated in slightly different terms than the SEC’s mission statement, 
Dodd–Frank’s required review attempts to balance the SEC’s longstanding 
and sometimes opposing goals of facilitating capital formation and 
protecting investors.89 
In August 2018, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton indicated that the 
Commission was working on a report that would, in part, review the 
accredited investor definition and examine whether the current rules that 
limit who can invest in private offerings should be expanded.90 Released on 
 
 85 Dodd–Frank Wall St. Reform & Consumer Prot. Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413(b)(2)(A), 
124 Stat. 1376, 1577–78 (2010). Dodd–Frank was passed in response to the Financial Crisis of 2008 and 
provided a broad overhaul of the financial regulatory system. For a discussion of Dodd–Frank’s financial 
reforms and the motivations behind them, see John L. Ropiequet et. al., The Dodd–Frank Act Changes 
the Consumer Finance Landscape, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 284, 285 (2010).  
 86 Net Worth Standard for Accredited Inv’rs, 76 Fed. Reg. 81794, Release No. IA-3341 (Dec. 29, 
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 239, 270, 275) [hereinafter 2011 Release] (implementing 
Dodd–Frank § 413(a) that directed the SEC to immediately remove the value of an investor’s primary 
residence from the calculation of individual and joint net worth). 
 87 § 230.501(a)(5)–(6). 
 88 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 413(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577–78 (2010). 
 89 These goals trace back to the Securities Act of 1933 and are evidenced by the SEC’s stated mission 
“to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” What 
We Do, supra note 26. While the goals generally align, a conflict can occur if adequate investor protection 
requires barriers that impede on capital formation. 
 90 Jay Clayton, Remarks on Capital Formation at the Nashville 36|86 Entrepreneurship Festival, 
SEC (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-clayton-082918 
[https://perma.cc/AMT7-BV99]; Dave Michaels, SEC Chairman Wants to Let More Main Street 
Investors in on Private Deals, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chairman-
wants-to-let-more-main-street-investors-in-on-private-deals-1535648208 [https://perma.cc/M2BH-
EH5C]. 
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June 19, 2019, the SEC’s report titled “Concept Release on Harmonization 
of Securities Offering Exemptions” builds upon a 2015 review by the SEC 
and solicits public comment on a number of alternative criteria to qualify as 
an accredited investor, including education, business, or investing 
experience, use of a professional, or even the administration of an accredited 
investor examination.91 A recent bill passed by the U.S. House of 
Representatives echoes these proposals, allowing individuals who have 
education or job experience that demonstrates professional knowledge of a 
subject related to a particular investment to qualify after verification by the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.92 While many of these alternative 
criteria seem promising and should be explored further, they are likely to 
supplement rather than replace the current framework.93 Monetary 
thresholds, despite being both over and underinclusive, have the key 
advantages of simplicity and ease of administration which allow issuers to 
conduct offerings with certainty, lowering the cost of capital and promoting 
its formation.94 As a result, even if other alternatives are adopted, monetary 
thresholds likely will remain a central component of the accredited investor 
definition and must be maintained to adequately protect investors.95 
This effort to expand the pool of accredited investors continues a trend 
since the adoption of Regulation D of focusing primarily on capital 
 
 91 SEC, CONCEPT RELEASE ON HARMONIZATION OF SECURITIES OFFERING  
EXEMPTIONS 56–57 (2019), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2019/33-10649.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/P6JW-XSCS] [hereinafter CONCEPT RELEASE]; 2015 Report, supra note 69, at 57–67. 
 92 JOBS and Investor Confidence Act, S. 488, 115th Cong. § 401(a)(2)(E) (2018). 
 93 See SEC, 37 GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION 17 
(2019), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor37.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YP6-ERNT] (recommending 
the maintenance of the existing monetary thresholds while expanding the categories of qualification for 
accredited investors status) [hereinafter “2018 Forum Report”]; Letter from SEC Advisory Committee 
on Small and Emerging Companies to Mary Jo White, Chair 3 (Mar. 9, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-accredited-investor-definition-recommendation-
030415.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6T2-CHRH] (offering recommendations regarding the accredited investor 
definition and recommending that current monetary thresholds be tied to inflation and new criteria that 
measure an investor’s sophistication be adopted). 
 94 The monetary thresholds may be overinclusive in that they qualify as accredited some individuals 
who are wealthy but not sufficiently sophisticated and may be underinclusive in that they exclude some 
individuals who may be sophisticated enough to invest in private placements but lack the necessary 
wealth. This point, inherent in any bright-line test, is also an issue with several of the alternative criteria 
proposed by the SEC. See 2015 Report, supra note 69, at 58–59 (acknowledging the challenges in 
deciding what educational degrees or professional certifications would be sufficient for an individual to 
qualify as accredited). 
 95 See supra note 93 (citing recommendations to the SEC to preserve the monetary thresholds while 
adding additional criteria); see also STEVEN T. MNUCHIN & CRAIG S. PHILLIPS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: CAPITAL MARKETS 44 (2017), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/documents/a-financial-system-capital-markets-
final-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/STG8-6K7M] (recommending expansion of the existing accredited 
investor definition to include additional ways of becoming accredited). 
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formation rather than investor protection. In the nearly four decades since 
the passage of Regulation D, there has been an almost uninterrupted 
liberalization of the accredited investor definition.96 While thresholds for 
income and net worth have remained static, inflation has increased tenfold 
the number of households who qualify for accredited status.97 This increase 
has been accompanied by the adoption of general solicitation in certain 
private offerings, significant preemption of state securities laws by federal 
law, and significant growth in the hedge fund industry, which presents 
accredited investors with increasingly complex investment opportunities.98 
With new risks and a pool of accredited investors that make up a far greater 
percentage of the population than what was originally contemplated, there is 
a real concern that the current accredited investor definition may not be 
sufficient to ensure that retail investors are adequately protected from risks 
of unregistered offerings. 
A. Unchanged Income and Net Worth Thresholds 
The most apparent and problematic aspect of the current accredited 
investor definition is that it has not been significantly revised since it was 
first implemented in 1982, even as the economic landscape within which it 
operates has shifted. Over the course of the last thirty-seven years, inflation 
has significantly degraded the financial thresholds that are the almost 
exclusive means of determining if a natural person qualifies as accredited.99 
When the definition was first introduced, only 1.5 million households, or 
1.8% of households nationwide, qualified.100 Today that number has grown 
to over 16 million, or 13% of households.101 Assuming that the definition’s 
financial thresholds had kept pace with inflation, an accredited investor in 
2019 would need to earn annually over $500,000 or have a net worth of over 
$2.7 million to qualify, rather than the $200,000 of annual income or $1 
million in net worth the law requires.102 With no inflationary adjustments, 
many people qualifying today stand in a very different financial position to 
 
 96 The lone example of a more restrictive definition is Dodd–Frank’s removal of an investor’s 
primary residence from the net worth calculation. See 2011 Release, supra note 86. 
 97 Jean Eaglesham & Coulter Jones, Opportunities to Invest in Private Companies Grow,  
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/opportunities-to-invest-in-private-
companies-grow-1537722023 [https://perma.cc/6UQQ-DYMH]. 
 98 See infra Sections II.B–II.D. 
 99 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4) provides a limited exception for a director, executive officer, or general 
partner of the issuer to qualify without needing to satisfy the financial thresholds. 
 100 2015 Report, supra note 69, at 48. 
 101 CONCEPT RELEASE, supra note 91, at 36. 
 102 Eaglesham, supra note 97. A dollar in March 1982 would have the same buying power as $2.71 
in August 2019. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, BUREAU LABOR STAT., 
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/QF4M-L35W]. 
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those envisioned by the SEC when Regulation D was first adopted. These 
investors may not have the sophistication necessary to participate in a private 
offering nor the ability to sustain a loss of investment. 
The SEC and Congress have both recognized the potential issues in an 
expanding accredited investor pool and have proposed revisions that would 
remedy those issues. In 2007, the SEC recommended changes to the 
accredited investor definition that would have indexed its financial 
thresholds to inflation every five years moving forward.103 The SEC 
acknowledged that by failing to adjust the definition, it had “effectively 
lowered the thresholds in terms of real purchasing power.”104 A public 
comment period was then held on the proposal where, similar to prior 
attempts to adjust the monetary thresholds, opinions were split along interest 
group lines, with the business lobby opposing any change that could 
potentially impede capital formation105 and consumer watchdogs pushing for 
more stringent requirements to protect investors.106 The business lobby 
ultimately prevailed, and the proposed changes were delayed as a new 
Director of Corporate Finance took over. They were never revisited.107 
Congress also sought to tackle this issue. In 2010, a provision within an 
early draft of Dodd–Frank would have required the SEC to set financial 
thresholds at an amount higher than their current level and adjust them for 
 
 103 Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, 91 SEC Docket 699–700, Securities 
Act Release No. 33-8828 (Aug. 3, 2007). 
 104 Id. at 699. 
 105 See, e.g., Nat’l Venture Cap. Ass’n, Comment Letter on Release Nos. 33-8828;  
IC-27922 (File No. S7-18-07) Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D 3  
(Oct. 9, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-07/s71807-68.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU2D-UN88] 
(recommending that the SEC retain the current net worth and income standards); Lee W. Mercer, Nat’l 
Ass’n of Small Bus. Inv., Cos., Comment Letter on File Number S7-18-07 2 (Oct. 8, 2007), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-07/s71807-28.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJ2C-LQTN] (“[There is] no 
need to increase the amounts specified for net worth and income criteria applicable to accredited investors 
under Regulation D as currently written . . . .”). 
 106 See, e.g., Karen Tyler, North Am. Secs. Adm’rs Ass’n, Inc., Comment Letter on Revisions of 
Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, (Oct. 26, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-
07/s71807-57.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JBZ-H4N7] (approving of proposed inflation adjustments and 
recommending that the SEC go even further to account for the previous twenty-five years with no 
adjustment); Bryan J. Lantagne, Massachusetts Secs. Div., Comment Letter on Revisions of Limited 
Offering Exemptions in Regulation D 6–7 (Oct. 12, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-
07/s71807-53.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QVW-AY5G] (advocating that the SEC significantly raise the 
financial thresholds and adjust them for inflation moving forward). 
 107 During a 2008 speech at the Business Law Fall Meeting, John W. White, then-Director  
of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, noted in regards to the proposed changes to Regulation D 
that he “truly thought [he would] get this one done by the close of the year, but reality [had] set in;”  
thus it would be “one for the next director.” John W. White, SEC, Division of Corporation Finance, 
Keynote Address at the ABA Section of Business Law Fall Meeting: Don’t Throw Out the Baby  
with the Bathwater (Nov. 21, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch112108jww.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X7WS-FB2Y]. 
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inflation every five years thereafter.108 This proposal was similarly opposed 
by the business lobby and ultimately omitted from the final Dodd–Frank 
Act.109 While Congress and the SEC have not taken action to this point, a 
tenfold increase in the number of qualifying households creates a very real 
concern that the accredited investor definition no longer identifies a group of 
investors with the wealth and presumed qualifications to be able to truly 
“fend for themselves without the protections afforded by registration.”110 
B. Rule 506(c) and the Approval of General Solicitation 
Since the Securities Act was first adopted, private offering exemptions 
have almost entirely prohibited the use of general solicitation or advertising 
in an offering.111 The SEC interprets general solicitation broadly, including 
the solicitation of anyone with whom an issuer does not have “a pre-existing, 
substantive relationship.”112 A relationship is considered substantive if it 
“would enable the issuer . . . to be aware of the financial circumstances or 
sophistication of the persons with whom the relationship exists or that 
otherwise [is] of some substance and duration.”113 This “pre-existing, 
substantive relationship” standard created a high bar for issuers and greatly 
restricted the pool of potential investors to whom they could conceivably sell 
their securities.114 Conversely, it also provided a limiting force on the number 
of private investment opportunities that an accredited investor could face. 
This changed in 2012 with the passage of the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act (the JOBS Act), which directed the SEC to remove its 
prohibition on general solicitation for certain private securities offerings, 
 
 108 See Restoring American Financial Stability Act, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 412 (2010) (directing the 
Commission to increase the financial thresholds for the accredited investor definition “by calculating an 
amount that is greater than the amount in effect on the date of enactment of this Act of $200,000 income 
for a natural person (or $300,000 for a couple) and $1,000,000 in assets, as the Commission determines 
is appropriate” and “adjust[ing] that threshold not less frequently than once every 5 years, to reflect the 
percentage increase in the cost of living”). 
 109 Jennifer J. Johnson, Fleecing Grandma: A Regulatory Ponzi Scheme, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
993, 1003 n.62 (2012). 
 110 Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Sec. Act of 
1933 for Transactions Involving Ltd. Offers & Sales, 23 SEC Docket 465, Securities Act Release No. 
6339 (Aug. 7, 1981). 
 111 A limited exception existed under Rule 504 provided that the offering was registered in a state 
requiring the use of a substantive disclosure document or that the securities were sold under a state 
exemption permitting general solicitation and the sale was limited to accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.504. 
 112 Sjostrom, supra note 21, at 1152. 
 113 Id. (citing Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 2811, at *2 (Dec. 4, 1985)). 
 114 Id. at 1152–53. 
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including those made under Rule 506.115 The SEC responded with Rule 
506(c), first released on July 10, 2013, which allows issuers under Rule 506 
to conduct general solicitation provided that securities are sold exclusively 
to accredited investors.116 Though it was designed with the intent of 
promoting job creation by providing small businesses with increased access 
to capital, the rule applies to businesses of all sizes—including pooled 
investment funds—and allows those businesses to market their securities 
through the Internet, television, and social media with little scrutiny by the 
SEC.117 
While some applauded Rule 506(c) for removing barriers to growth for 
emerging companies,118 criticism quickly mounted. Commentators decried 
the lack of economic analysis that went into the rule’s formulation and the 
potential harm that could occur to investors through the mass marketing of 
often risky private investments that can be difficult to resell.119 Dissent even 
came from inside the SEC, with then-Commissioner Luis Aguilar voting 
against the rule and noting that “general solicitation clearly has the potential 
to put investors at risk” as it allows “fraudsters to cast a wider net for 
victims.”120 
Critics like Luis Aguilar are particularly concerned about vulnerable 
investor groups such as the elderly, who may have the lifetime earnings 
necessary to qualify as an accredited investor, based on the standard’s dated 
wealth requirements, but lack the sophistication necessary to make informed 
 
 115 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 314 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d note (2012)). 
 116 Eliminating the Prohibition Against Gen. Solicitation & Gen. Advert. in Rule 506 & Rule 144A 
Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44771, Securities Act Release No. 33-9415 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 239, 242). 
 117 Manning Gilbert Warren III, The False Promise of Publicly Offered Private Placements, 68 SMU 
L. REV. 899, 900–01 (2015). 
 118 See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow General Solicitation and 
Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004). 
 119 See, e.g., Consumer Federation of America, Americans for Financial Reform & AFL-CIO, 
Comment Letter on the JOBS Act General Solicitation Rulemaking (Apr. 23, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-12/s70712-254.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H78-KS6Y] (criticizing the 
rule in its current state because it would “deny investors much needed protections as it throws open the 
door to mass marketing of these often risky and illiquid ‘private’ securities”); A. Heath Abshure, 
President, North Am. Secs. Adm’rs Ass’n Inc., Comment Letter on Release No. 33-9354 “Eliminating 
the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A” (Oct. 
3, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-12/s70712-92.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCQ5-DNVW] 
(recognizing that there were competing interests behind the passage of the rule but expressing 
disappointment that it failed to “implement any protections for investors, even those that would be 
minimally burdensome to issuers”). 
 120 Luis A. Aguilar, Facilitating General Solicitation at the Expense of Investors,  
SEC (July 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/open-meeting-statement-laa-3#_edn9 
[https://perma.cc/MHR5-UUC7]. 
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investment decisions.121 Besides having higher concentrations of wealth 
which may make them a target, the elderly may face increased risk of being 
defrauded due to poor physical health, mental impairment, or dependency on 
others.122 As one study on elder exploitation put it, “[o]lder adults are more 
likely to have financial resources than their younger counterparts, and this, 
in combination with the higher prevalence of social isolation, cognitive 
impairment, and other factors, renders them uniquely susceptible to financial 
exploitation.”123 These individuals were previously protected if they had no 
preexisting relationships with issuers but may now be solicited for a wide 
range of complex private offerings by complete strangers who may not have 
their best interest in mind.124 
The dangers of general solicitation manifested in the SEC’s recent suit 
against the Woodbridge Group of Companies (Woodbridge) and its 
directors, brokers, and advisers, who relied upon Rule 506(c) to defraud 
thousands of investors. The organization, led by owner Robert H. Shapiro, 
raised more than $1.22 billion through unregistered securities offerings from 
over 8,400 investors nationwide.125 Solicited through advertisements across 
multiple media platforms, investors were promised high returns from the 
interest that Woodbridge made lending to third parties.126 Despite raising 
 
 121 Id. See also Jason Zweig, Want to Buy a Private Stock?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2012, 6:30 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443589304577637790108826970 
[https://perma.cc/36GL-NQ32] (quoting a former Michigan state securities regulator who voiced 
concerns that the elderly would be targeted and noted that “many investors worth more than $1 million 
are afflicted with Alzheimer’s or other forms of dementia—and are thus especially prone to having their 
money pried out of them by the promotions the new law makes possible”). 
 122 STEPHEN DEANE, SEC OFFICE OF THE INV’R ADVOCATE, ELDER FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION: 
WHY IT IS A CONCERN, WHAT REGULATORS ARE DOING ABOUT IT, AND LOOKING AHEAD 1 (2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/elder-financial-exploitation.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4JQ-JTKH]. 
 123 Janey C. Peterson et al., Financial Exploitation of Older Adults: A Population-Based Prevalence 
Study, 29 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1615, 1615 (2014). 
 124 The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) included private offerings 
on its annual Top Investor Threats List in 2013, stating that “the advertising of private offerings . . . will 
lead to greater abuse by unscrupulous promoters.” NASAA Expands Annual Top Investor Threat List, 
NASAA (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.nasaa.org/27012/nasaa-expands-annual-top-investor-threats-list/ 
[https://perma.cc/TQK2-PN3H]. Recently, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau also reported that 
suspected cases of financial exploitation of the elderly had increased 19% in 2017 and were nearly three 
times the level reported in 2014. See Yuka Hayashi, Elder Fraud on the Rise, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/elder-fraud-on-the-rise-11551309306 [https://perma.cc/74X7-EKCF]. 
 125 Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 2, SEC v. Shapiro, No. 17-cv-24624-
COOKE/GOODMAN (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2018); see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges  
Operators of $1.2 Billion Ponzi Scheme Targeting Main Street Investors (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-235 [https://perma.cc/T6BS-556Q]. 
 126 Amended Complaint, supra note 125, at 2, 14–15. In an effort to avoid registration of its 
securities, Woodbridge claimed that its offering was limited only to accredited investors. Id. at 18. Though 
making that claim, Woodbridge did nothing to evaluate whether the individuals it solicited qualified under 
the accredited investor definition. Id. at 23. 
114:507 (2019) Accredited Investors: A Need for Increased Protection 
527 
over $1 billion, Woodbridge turned out to be a Ponzi scheme that actually 
generated only $13.7 million in interest income and used new investments to 
pay expected returns to its existing investors.127 When this scheme collapsed 
in 2017, Woodbridge filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, leaving investors with 
losses of over $961 million.128 Of the 8,400 defrauded investors, at least 
2,600 invested retirement savings, amounting to nearly $400 million.129 
Woodbridge recently reached a settlement, agreeing to pay $1 billion in 
penalties and disgorgement. However, it remains to be seen at what level 
investors will be able to recover.130  
While Ponzi schemes have been around for years, Woodbridge 
demonstrates how general solicitation can now be used by “fraudsters to cast 
a wider net for victims” in those schemes.131 Today’s expanded pool of 
accredited investors may be presented with investment opportunities through 
social media or through a phone call from a complete stranger. These 
investors need to be sophisticated enough to evaluate the merits of those 
offerings and able to withstand any potential losses. Although use of Rule 
506(c) has remained relatively limited so far,132 general solicitation creates 
new risks that necessitate a strengthened accredited investor definition. 
C. Preemption of State Securities Laws 
The accredited investor definition has also come to play an increased 
role in protecting investors because of Congress’s decision to allow state 
securities laws to be significantly preempted by federal law. When the 
Securities Act was first passed, it left intact the complex web of state blue 
sky regulations, permitting states to continue their own registration and 
exemption requirements for securities sold to their citizens.133 While many 
of these state regulations came to mirror their federal counterparts over 
 
 127 Id. at 2. 
 128 Id. at 2–3. 
 129 Id. at 14. 
 130 See Press Release, SEC, Court Orders $1 Billion Judgment Against Operators of Woodbridge 
Ponzi Scheme Targeting Retail Investors (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-
3 [https://perma.cc/3YYL-BE5G]; Jay Weaver, A $1.2 Billion Ponzi Case Settles, but Will Victims Ever 
See Their Money—or Justice?, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 2, 2019; 12:01 PM), https://www. 
miamiherald.com/news/local/article217040845.html [https://perma.cc/U3XV-UDYW] (noting that 
investor recovery could be limited to fifty to seventy percent or less of initial investments and may take 
years). 
 131 See Aguilar, supra note 120. 
 132 Since its inception only $255 billion, or 4% of total capital, raised under Regulation D has been 
conducted pursuant to Rule 506(c). BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 4, at 2. 
 133 Daniel J. Morrissey, The Securities Act at Its Diamond Jubilee: Renewing the Case for a Robust 
Registration Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 749, 774 (2009). 
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time,134 states continued to maintain an emphasis on the merits of an offering 
rather than the mere disclosure of its details.135 These state laws served as “a 
second line of protection for investors, one that saw to it they would be 
treated fairly.”136 
This changed when Congress passed the National Securities Markets 
Improvements Act of 1996 (NSMIA).137 The NSMIA was a deregulatory 
reform which preempted the state regulation of “covered securities,” 
including private placements made pursuant to Rule 506.138 The Act was 
designed to reduce the cost of capital and facilitate capital formation by 
eliminating redundant and unnecessary state securities regulations.139 To 
achieve this goal, the NSMIA preempted state law for all private exemptions 
under Rule 506, regardless of whether they were national in scope or made 
within the borders of a single state.140 
While states are still permitted to conduct ex-post fraud investigations 
and prosecution, they no longer function as “‘local cops’ on the beat” for 
Rule 506 offerings.141 Local regulators note that prior to the NSMIA, states 
often used violations of their local registration provisions to stop fraud at an 
early stage.142 Federal preemption eliminated this tool, meaning states must 
now prove fraud in order to stop it.143 This requires significant time and 
effort, taxing already limited state resources, and exposing the public to harm 
for a greater period of time.144 Indeed, after the passage of the NSMIA, 
regulators “observed a steady and significant rise in the number of offerings 
 
 134 Annual Conference on Uniformity of Sec. Laws, 31 SEC Docket 1045–46, Securities Act Release 
No. 6561 (Dec. 6, 1984) (endorsing a Uniform Limited Offering Exemption promulgated by the NASAA 
that was intended to coordinate with Regulation D and be uniform among the states). 
 135 UNIF. SEC. ACT § 304 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2005). 
 136 Morrissey, supra note 133, at 775. 
 137 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 
(1996). 
 138 Id. § 102(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)–(b)); Sjostrom, supra note 21, at 1152. 
 139 Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 151, 156 
(2010). 
 140 Id. at 154. 
 141 Id. at 154, 159 (quoting Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995: Hearings 
on H.R. 2131 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 
(1995)). 
 142 See North American Secs. Adm’rs Ass’n, Comment Letter on the Definition of Qualified 
Purchaser; Release No. 33-8041 (Mar. 4, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72301/borg1.htm 
[https://perma.cc/R7XL-SXWS]. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
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made pursuant to Rule 506 that [were] later discovered to be fraudulent.”145 
This reduction in state regulation, combined with the minimal oversight 
given to private placements by federal law, has created what one 
commentator calls “a regulatory black hole.”146 In this black hole, the 
accredited investor definition provides the primary method of shielding 
vulnerable investors from fraud or other investment schemes. The 
definition’s standards must be strengthened to ensure that it is performing its 
job adequately.  
D. A Changing Investment Landscape—The Proliferation of Hedge Funds 
Accredited investors also face significantly more complex investment 
opportunities relative to when Regulation D was first adopted in 1982. This 
change is most apparent in the tremendous growth of the hedge fund 
industry.147 Few hedge funds operated in the early 1980s, and those that did 
advertised through word of mouth and had high minimum requirements that 
limited investment to a close network of very rich individuals.148 In 1990, 
there were roughly 600 active hedge funds containing $40 billion in assets.149 
By 2018, those numbers had increased dramatically to 9,175 funds 
containing $3.969 trillion in net assets.150 These funds may invest in unusual 
assets that are difficult to accurately value, and investors often face opaque 
fee arrangements, limitations on their ability to redeem shares, and limited 
disclosure with which to make investment decisions.151 
A majority of today’s funds are lightly regulated and escape registration 
under the Securities Act by structuring their offerings as Rule 506 private 
placements that are limited only to accredited investors.152 Hedge funds are 
 
 145 Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets—Part II: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 86 (2009) (statement of Fred J. 
Joseph, President, NASAA). 
 146 Johnson, supra note 139, at 155. 
 147 A hedge fund pools money, generally from accredited investors, and invests that money with the 
hope of a positive return. Hedge funds have significant flexibility in the type of investments that they can 
make and often pursue more speculative strategies than other investment vehicles such as mutual funds. 
See Investor Bulletin: Hedge Funds, INVESTOR.GOV (Oct. 3, 2012), https://www.investor.gov/additional-
resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletin-hedge-funds [https://perma.cc/KWL6-5LB6]. 
 148 Jan Fichtner, The Rise of Hedge Funds: A Story of Inequality, 2 MOMENTUM Q. 3, 6 (2013). 
 149 Id. 
 150 SEC DIV. OF INV. MGMT. ANALYTICS OFFICE, PRIVATE FUNDS STATISTICS: FIRST CALENDAR 
QUARTER 2018, at 4–5 (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/private-funds-
statistics/private-funds-statistics-2018-q1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG25-KSV2]. 
 151 Hedge Funds, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/ 
investment-products/hedge-funds [https://perma.cc/D3X9-7YC4]. 
 152 Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, STAFF REP. TO THE U.S. SEC.  
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 11 (2003), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R3QF-8N3Q] (“Hedge funds . . . typically rely on one of two statutory exclusions from 
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currently the largest private fund issuer under Regulation D and have raised 
almost $3.1 trillion since 2009 with $382 billion raised in 2017 alone.153 
While hedge funds are also subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940 
and its registration requirements, that Act also contains significant 
exemptions from registration for funds that are limited to “qualified 
purchasers”154 or for smaller funds with 100 or fewer investors.155 Known as 
3(c)(1) funds for the exemption they use, these smaller funds are of particular 
concern to this discussion because the accredited investor definition serves 
as the primary gatekeeper to supposedly identify those investors capable of 
evaluating the risks and merits of the investment. This is not an easy task 
given the lack of required disclosure and wide range of complex investment 
methods hedge funds employ, which often include short selling, substantial 
leverage, and exotic arbitrage strategies.156 Unlike investors in the stock of a 
public company, who can rely upon mandated disclosure and securities 
prices that will generally be an accurate reflection of that information, 
investors in private funds must know what information to request from the 
fund and be sophisticated enough to evaluate that information themselves to 
make an informed decision.157 
Following a decade of significant growth158 and the publicized failure 
of several high-profile hedge funds,159 the SEC revisited its exemption 
 
the definition of investment company, which enables them to avoid the regulatory provisions of that 
Act.”); Fichtner, supra note 148, at 8 (stating that hedge funds typically try to be exempt under the 
Securities Act in order “to prevent having to reveal proprietary trading strategies and other information”). 
 153 See BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 4, at 22. 
 154 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2018). The standard for qualified purchaser is more demanding than that 
for accredited investor and requires that an individual own at least $5 million in investments. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(i) . 
 155 § 80a-3(c)(7)(B)(ii)(I). 
 156 See Fichtner, supra note 148, at 9. 
 157 This assumes the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH), which was developed by 
economists in the 1960s. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 8, at 30–31. Under the semi-strong version of 
the ECMH, which is generally accepted in securities regulation, the stock price of a company’s actively 
traded stock will reflect all relevant publicly available information. Id. at 31. Thus, retail investors 
purchasing that stock can be confident that its price is an accurate reflection of all public information 
without needing to do any research themselves. Id. This is not the case in private placements where 
information is not widely dispersed and securities are lightly traded. 
 158 SEC Staff Report, supra note 152, at 1 n.4 (noting that hedge fund assets grew from $50 billion 
in 1993 to $592 billion in 2003, a 1084% increase). 
 159 The failure of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 and Amaranth Advisors in 2006 
both received extensive media coverage. LTCM, which was leveraged 25 to 1 with derivative positions 
in excess of $1.5 trillion, suffered staggering losses from miscalculations on risky debt and government 
bonds. See Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory 
Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 984. Banks, including the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, were forced to invest $3.5 billion to avoid a global financial crisis. Bailout of Long-
Term Capital Sets Markets Reeling and Hands Wringing, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 1998, 6:00 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB906738963166811000. Amaranth Advisors, the largest hedge fund at 
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framework in the early 2000s to see if revisions were necessary to adequately 
protect investors. This review culminated in a proposed rule in 2006 that 
would have added a new category of accredited investor called an 
“accredited natural person.”160 As proposed, the new category would apply 
to 3(c)(1) funds and limit the offering and sale of their securities to investors 
who met the existing net worth or income requirements under Rule 501(a) 
and also owned at least $2.5 million in investments.161 The new rule was 
“designed to help ensure that only investors that are capable of evaluating 
the merits and risks of investments in certain 3(c)(1) Pools may invest in 
such pools.”162 The SEC admitted that the existing definition of “accredited 
investor” might insufficiently protect investors in part because inflation and 
increases in wealth and income have brought many potential investors above 
the thresholds necessary to qualify them as accredited.163 Despite its 
concerns, the SEC ultimately never adopted the new rule with no explicit 
rationale provided. 
Following the SEC’s failure to implement the accredited natural person 
standard, inflation continues to expand the pool of accredited investors, 
magnifying concerns that the standard provides insufficient protection to 
ensure that less sophisticated retail investors are protected from the unique 
risks of investing in a hedge fund. A prime example of these risks is the 
complete loss recently suffered by the hedge fund OptionSellers. Headed by 
founder James Cordier, OptionSellers was a Florida-based hedge fund that 
pursued high returns through an aggressive investment strategy in 
commodities.164 Predicting a warmer than expected 2018 winter, Cordier bet 
against natural gas and made the imprudent decision to sell naked call 
options, an unhedged position carrying unlimited risk.165 These options 
 
the time, collapsed after a wrong-sided bet on natural gas that lost the fund $5 billion in just over a week. 
Ann Davis et al., What Went Wrong at Amaranth, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2006), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115871715733268470 [https://perma.cc/T8DU-8DVL]. 
 160 Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, Release No. 33-
8766 (Jan. 4, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 275). 
 161 Id. at 405. 
 162 Id. at 413. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See Naureen S Malik et al., Founder of Stricken Hedge Fund Promoted Naked Option Selling, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 20, 2018, 8:33 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-21/founder-
of-stricken-hedge-fund-promoted-selling-of-naked-options [https://perma.cc/637B-345P]. 
 165 Id.; Susan Taylor Martin, Tampa Bay Lightning Owner Jeff Vinik Among Clients Who Lost Money 
in Collapse of Tampa-Based Investment Fund, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 23, 2018), https:// 
www.tampabay.com/business/in-youtube-video-tampa-hedge-fund-manager-apologies-for-losing-
millons-of-his-clients-money-20181123/ [https://perma.cc/9LJX-JR77]. A “naked call” is one in which 
the seller of the call option does not actually own the underlying commodity. Evan Niu, What is a Naked 
Call?, THE MOTLEY FOOL (May 11, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/ 
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would profit if the price of the commodity fell, but on November 14, in what 
Cordier would refer to as a “rogue wave,” the price of natural gas shot up 
nearly twenty percent for its biggest intraday gain since 2010.166 FCStone 
Inc., the brokerage that cleared trades for OptionSellers, was forced to 
liquidate the fund’s accounts to cover its position.167 When these accounts 
did not prove sufficient to cover the naked options, FCStone borrowed on 
margin against its own clients’ accounts and notified OptionSellers’ 
investors that they would owe an additional $35.3 million beyond what they 
had originally invested, for total losses exceeding $150 million.168 While 
litigation seems likely,169 the fund does not appear to have been fraudulent 
and investors are unlikely to recover any of their losses. The demise of 
OptionSellers exemplifies the risks inherent in certain hedge funds and, more 
importantly, demonstrates the need for a strong accredited investor definition 
that can be reasonably expected to identify a group of investors capable of 
evaluating those risks. 
III. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE CURRENT DEFINITION 
When the SEC adopted Regulation D in 1982, the accredited investor 
definition avoided the pitfalls of earlier exemptions by providing issuers with 
an objective, bright-line test that could be reliably administered.170 The 
definition looks solely at wealth as proxy for sophistication and the ability to 
fend for oneself.171 Because wealth is currently the sole determinant of who 
is able to invest in a private offering, it is essential that the monetary 
thresholds be maintained to reliably identify those investors who truly do not 
need the protections offered by registration. In 1983, only 1.8% of all 
households met that demanding standard.172 Today, as a result of inflation 
and inaction, that number has increased to thirteen percent, encompassing 
some sixteen million households.173 
 
options/2016/05/11/what-is-a-naked-call.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y9S6-WLFN]. It carries unlimited risk 
as the commodity’s price could rise to any level before the option is exercised. Id. 
 166 Malik, supra note 164. 
 167 Simon Casey et al., Broker Seeks $35 Million From Customers of Wiped-Out Fund Manager, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2018, 5:06 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-29/broker-
seeks-millions-from-customers-of-wiped-out-fund-manager [https://perma.cc/A5GF-2VFL]. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Attorney John Chapman has already brought a suit for gross negligence against broker FCStone 
and notes that “Option Sellers may face legal action as well.” Attorney Sues After Tampa Hedge Fund 
Goes Under, FOX 13 (Jan. 15, 2019, 11:14 PM), https://www.fox13news.com/news/local-news/attorney-
sues-after-tampa-hedge-fund-goes-under [https://perma.cc/6VMB-4A5W]. 
 170 See supra Part II for a discussion of predecessors to Regulation D. 
 171 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6). 
 172 2015 Report, supra note 69, at 48. 
 173 CONCEPT RELEASE, supra note 91, at 36. 
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A tenfold increase in the number of households qualifying as accredited 
might be justified if there were new developments that lowered the risk of 
investing in a private offering. However, that has not been the case.174 Despite 
the expansion of the accredited investor pool, investors may now be solicited 
to participate in private offerings by complete strangers, receive less 
protection as a result of the preemption of state securities laws, and face 
increasingly complex investment opportunities from issuers such as hedge 
funds.175 As such, revisions must be made to improve investor protection. To 
ensure that the accredited investor definition captures only those investors 
“whose financial sophistication and ability to sustain the risk of loss . . . 
render the protections of the Securities Act’s registration process 
unnecessary,”176 the definition’s wealth thresholds should be increased and 
tied to inflation moving forward. Additionally, retirement accounts should 
be excluded from the calculation of net worth to more accurately identify 
investors capable of bearing the risks of investment. 
A. Increase Income and Net Worth Thresholds 
If the monetary thresholds of the accredited investor definition were 
adjusted for inflation since March 1982, an investor in 2019 would need to 
earn about $543,000 per year (or $814,500 with spouse) or have a net worth 
of about $2,714,900 to qualify.177 Some commentators have called for a full 
and immediate increase to those levels along with periodic inflationary 
adjustments moving forward.178 The SEC itself has actually had success with 
 
 174 One could argue that technology has improved overall access to market information allowing 
investors to become more sophisticated as a whole; however, this does not relate to access to the 
information on a specific company involved in a private offering. This issuer-specific information is what 
is necessary to make an informed investment decision. The argument also does not consider the investor’s 
ability to bear the risk of loss, which is a crucial piece of the existing accredited investor definition. 
 175 See supra Sections II.B–II.D. 
 176 1987 Release, supra note 14, at *2. 
 177 Amounts were calculated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI Inflation Calculator. The time 
period examined was March 1982 to August 2019. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., 
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/HE6N-529J]. 
 178 See, e.g., Managed Funds Association, Comment Letter on Managed Funds Association 
Regulatory Priorities 39 (May 18, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-16/s70716-1761663-
152156.pdf [http://perma.cc/G3AS-9WAU] (recommending that the SEC amend the income and net 
worth thresholds to account for inflation and indexing those thresholds for inflation moving forward); 
North Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n., Inc., Comment Letter on SEC’s Report on the Review of the Definition 
of “Accredited Investor” 3 (May 25, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-692/4692-34.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K79T-3PV3] (same); Pub. Inv’rs Arbitration Bar Ass’n, Comment Letter on the SEC 
Staff’s December 18, 2015 Report on the Definition of “Accredited Investor” 3 (May 17, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-692/4692-33.pdf [htpps://perma.cc/R8G5-LSMS] (same); Cornell 
Law School, Securities Law Clinic, Comment Letter on Report on the Review of the Definition of 
“Accredited Investor” 4–5 (Apr. 30, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-692/4692-28.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/75V9-PXTA] (same). 
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that approach in its revision of the “qualified client” definition under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.179 A qualified client under that Act is 
currently defined as a natural person who has at least $1 million in assets 
under management or who has a net worth that exceeds $2.1 million.180 Those 
thresholds were previously set in 1998 at $750,000 and $1.5 million and were 
increased by Section 418 of Dodd–Frank to account for inflation between 
1998 and 2010.181 Dodd–Frank also mandated that the thresholds be adjusted 
for inflation every five years after, with the first inflationary adjustment 
taking place in 2016.182 
While it might be ideal to have the accredited investor definition fully 
account for inflation if the adjustments are made progressively, it is unlikely 
that a one-time increase to account for thirty-seven years of inflation would 
be feasible today. Issuers in 2017 raised $1.8 trillion through Regulation D, 
more than through all registered offerings.183 Small business advocates are 
rightly concerned that such a dramatic change to such an important source 
of capital could be disruptive and have a materially adverse effect on the 
market.184 Additionally, if the thresholds were made too restrictive, issuers 
could choose to forgo Regulation D’s safe harbor and attempt to conduct 
private offerings directly through the exemption provided by Section 4(a)(2) 
of the Securities Act.185 This route would increase complexity, since issuers 
would need to comply with the securities law of each state involved in the 
offering and would also create greater uncertainty overall.186 
Fortunately, the SEC is not restricted to an all-or-nothing increase nor 
is it required to raise both monetary thresholds equally.187 Given this 
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 182 2016 Order, supra note 180, at 2–3. 
 183 BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 4, at 7–8 (stating that Regulation D constituted $1.8 trillion of the 
total $3 trillion raised through all private placements). 
 184 See Angel Capital Association, Comment Letter on Accredited Investor Definition Comment and 
Recommendations 1, 3 (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-13/s70613-490.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/84A3-EU4D] (recommending no change to the existing financial thresholds as an 
increase would cause the “startup ecosystem [to] face grave disruption from a dramatic shrinkage of [the] 
vital investor pool, especially in regions where venture capital is not prevalent.”). 
 185 2015 Report, supra note 69, at 47. 
 186 Id. at 47 n.175. 
 187 Dodd–Frank gives the SEC the power to adjust the monetary thresholds “as the Commission may 
deem appropriate for the protection of investors, in the public interest, and in light of the economy.” 
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flexibility, the SEC should make it a priority during its upcoming review to 
conduct a thorough economic analysis of the impact that raising the 
monetary thresholds would have on companies’ abilities to raise capital and 
the protection provided to investors. Based on this analysis, the SEC could 
then determine increases to each threshold that would afford greater investor 
protection without unduly impeding capital formation.188 Though an increase 
to the existing thresholds would be beneficial itself, the more important piece 
will be adjusting that amount for inflation moving forward. This change is 
less controversial189 and should not prove burdensome to the SEC because it 
could be done every four years during the review already mandated by 
Dodd–Frank.190 Together, an immediate increase in the wealth thresholds 
coupled with inflationary adjustments moving forward, would provide 
improved protection now and ensure that this investor protection would not 
be eroded in the future. 
B. Exclude Retirement Plans from the Calculation of Net Worth 
Along with the changes discussed above, the SEC should exclude 
retirement plans from the calculation of net worth for accredited investors. 
Today, 401(k) plans alone hold $6.2 trillion in assets and have more than 
97.6 million participants, with both figures increasing each year.191 By mid-
2018, individual retirement accounts (IRAs) held an additional $9.3 trillion 
 
§ 413(b), 15 U.S.C. 77b note (2010). Market developments since the passage of Regulation D, such as 
the removal of an investor’s primary residence from the calculation of net worth, may justify a larger 
increase to one threshold in comparison to the other. See 2011 Release, supra note 86. 
 188 This general approach has been endorsed by several commentators. See, e.g., Certified Fin. 
Planner Bd. of Standards, Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and 
Rule 156 Under Securities Act 7 (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-13/s70613-
608.pdf [https://perma.cc/VB54-KQQG] (urging the SEC to conduct an economic analysis in order to 
“find a point at which investors receive meaningful protection and issuers are able to raise the capital they 
need cost-effectively”); Consumer Fed’n of Am. & Ams. for Fin. Reform, Comment Letter on Report on 
the Review of the Definition of “Accredited Investor” 3 (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/4-692/4692-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5CG-UWE6]. 
 189 The SEC received over fifty comments on its 2015 Accredited Investor Staff Report with only 
two explicitly rejecting inflationary adjustments on an ongoing basis. See National Small Business 
Association, Comment Letter on the SEC Report on the Review of the Definition of Accredited Investor 
(Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-692/4692-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB23-ATPE] 
(“Indexing the thresholds levels for the accredited investor definition may complicate compliance as the 
thresholds will change.”); Small Business Investor Alliance, Comment Letter on the SEC Report on the 
Review of the Definition of Accredited Investor (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
692/4692-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/75ZZ-HFWQ] (arguing that adding new inflationary adjustments 
moving forward would reduce the pool of potential investors and hurt small business investment). 
 190 See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 413(b)(1)(B)(2), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77b note (2010). 
 191 401(k) Fast Facts, AM. BENEFITS COUNCIL (Jan. 2019), https://www.americanbenefitscouncil. 
org/pub/e613e1b6-f57b-1368-c1fb-966598903769 [https://perma.cc/4GKU-MATF]. 
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and made up nearly one-third of the U.S. retirement market.192 While 
investing in a retirement account of this type is certainly a prudent financial 
decision, it is not a reliable indicator of the ability to fend for oneself when 
determining accredited investor status.193 
Prior to Dodd–Frank, it was common for investors to qualify as 
accredited largely because of the value of their primary residence—an asset 
critical to that investor’s well-being and one not closely tied to the 
individual’s investment ability.194 This changed in 2011 when the accredited 
investor definition was revised to exclude the value of an investor’s primary 
residence from the calculation of net worth.195 The SEC at that time noted 
that “[o]ne purpose of the accredited investor concept is to identify persons 
who can bear the economic risk of an investment in unregistered securities, 
including the ability to hold unregistered (and therefore less liquid) securities 
for an indefinite period and, if necessary, to afford a complete loss of such 
investment.”196 Those qualifying solely as the result of the home they lived 
in were clearly not a group who could afford complete loss of investment. 
Many of the same concerns related to an investor’s primary residence 
apply equally to that investor’s retirement accounts. Investors who are retired 
or nearing retirement may qualify as  accredited investors entirely on the 
basis of retirement accounts that have been built passively over the investor’s 
lifetime.197 The SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee voiced concern that 
many of these investors could qualify based on a “nest egg that they rely on 
to provide regular income that will need to last them throughout their 
 
 192 Frequently Asked Questions About Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), INV. CO.  
INST. (June 2019), https://www.ici.org/faqs/faq/Individual-Retirement-Accounts-(IRAs)-FAQs/ci.faqs_ 
iras.print [https://perma.cc/9GDN-5QAR]. 
 193 This same logic applies to government or private sector defined benefit plans where wealth is 
passively built and no investment sophistication is needed. A defined benefit plan provides a fixed 
monthly payment upon retirement that is calculated through a plan formula, often looking at factors such 
as the employee’s salary at retirement and length of service. Types of Retirement Plans, U.S. DEP’T 
LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/retirement/typesofplans [https://perma.cc/8XAL-STQ9]. 
 194 Manning G. Warren III & Marc L. Steinberg, Comment Letter on SEC Release No. 33-9177 (Jan. 
31, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-04-11/s70411-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2EA-XXCU]. 
 195 Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, 76 Fed. Reg. 81793, 81793 (Dec. 29, 2011). 
 196 Id. at 81794. 
 197 Recommendation of the Investor Advisory Committee: Accredited Investor Definition, INV. 
ADVISORY COMM. 3 (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-
2012/accredited-investor-definition-recommendation.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LUN-EEZC] [hereinafter 
Advisory Committee Report]. The Investor Advisory Committee is a product of Dodd–Frank and 
intended to advise the SEC “on initiatives to protect investor interests and to promote investor  
confidence and the integrity of the securities marketplace.” Spotlight on Investor Advisory  
Committee, SEC (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/U3YG-9JTT]. 
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remaining years.”198 These individuals are unable to absorb significant losses 
and would suffer adverse consequences if this planned retirement income 
was reduced.199 
This issue will continue to become more predominant as a growing 
number of people reach retirement age. By 2030, it is anticipated that 74 
million, or one in five persons, in the United States will be age sixty-five or 
over.200 That number is projected to grow to 88 million by 2050 and to more 
than 98 million by 2060.201 These individuals frequently need the wealth built 
up in retirement accounts to sustain themselves and also face increased risks 
of being defrauded as a result of age-related factors.202 As a result, they do 
not represent a population well-suited to investing in private placements. 
While the exclusion of retirement accounts will undoubtedly reduce the 
current pool of accredited investors,203 this reduction may be offset by the 
adoption of alternative criteria204 and will allow the net worth threshold to 
serve as a more accurate indicator of sophistication, helping to ensure that 
the accredited investor definition identifies only those who truly can fend for 
themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
Since its adoption in 1982, the accredited investor definition has done 
well for private capital formation but has not been adequately maintained to 
protect investors. Thirty-seven years of inflation, along with increased 
investor risk because of other market developments, has culminated in a 
definition that can no longer be relied upon to identify a group of investors 
suitable for private placements. In order to fulfill its dual goals of facilitating 
capital formation and protecting investors, the SEC should increase the 
accredited investor definition’s income and net worth thresholds, tie those 
new amounts to inflation moving forward, and consider excluding retirement 
accounts entirely from the calculation of net worth. Through those changes, 
the definition can once again identify those capable of fending for 
themselves in a private offering. 
  
 
 198 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 197, at 3. 
 199 Id. at 4. 
 200 DEANE, supra note 122, at 2. 
 201 Id. 
 202 See supra notes 121–124 (discussing factors that increase investment risk for older individuals). 
 203 In 2015, the SEC estimated that 9.21 million households qualified as accredited investors through 
the net worth test and that this number would drop to 6.75 million if retirement accounts were excluded. 
2015 Report, supra note 69, at 51. 
 204 See id. at 57–67 for a discussion of some alternative criteria that the SEC has considered. 
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